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Recent research finds that the stocks that mutual fund managers buy outperform the stocks that 
they sell (e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000)). We study the nature of this stock-picking 
ability. We construct measures of trading skill based on how the stocks held and traded by fund 
managers perform at subsequent corporate earnings announcements. This approach increases 
power to detect skilled trading and sheds light on its source. We find that the average fund’s 
recent buys significantly outperform its recent sells around the next earnings announcement, and 
that this accounts for a disproportionate fraction of the total abnormal returns to fund trades 
estimated in prior work. We find that mutual fund trades also forecast earnings surprises. We 
conclude that mutual fund managers are able to trade profitably in part because they are able to 
forecast earnings-related fundamentals. 
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I. Introduction 
 Can mutual fund managers pick stocks? This question has long interested financial 
economists due to its practical implications for investors and for the light it sheds on market 
efficiency. Two broad conclusions from the literature stand out. Many studies since Jensen 
(1968) find that the average returns of mutual fund portfolios tend to underperform passive 
benchmarks, especially net of fees. At the same time, in recent results far more encouraging for 
active fund managers, Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find that the individual trades made 
by mutual fund managers illustrate some stock-picking skill. In particular, the stocks that funds 
buy have higher returns than those they sell over the next few quarters.1  
Some of the gap between these two results simply reflects transaction costs and 
management fees. Nonetheless, given the evidence of skilled trading by mutual fund managers, it 
is natural to turn to the question of how they manage to distinguish winners from losers in their 
trades. We address this question. We build on the findings of Chen et al. and other studies of the 
performance of mutual fund trades, such as Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Wermers (1999), by 
constructing an alternative method of identifying trading skill. We associate trading skill with the 
ability to buy stocks that are about to enjoy high returns upon their upcoming quarterly earnings 
announcement and to sell stocks that are about to suffer low returns upon that announcement.  
This approach is complementary to traditional tests using long horizon returns, but it has 
some advantages. First, it may have more power to detect trading skill, as it exploits segments of 
                                                 
1 Obviously, the literature on mutual fund performance is vast and cannot be summarized here. An abbreviated set of 
other important studies includes: Ippolito (1989) and Carhart (1997), who conclude that mutual fund managers have 
little or no stock-picking skill; Grinblatt and Titman (1993), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), and 
Wermers (2000), who conclude that a significant degree of skill exists; and Lehman and Modest (1987) and Ferson 
and Schadt (1996), who emphasize the sensitivity of results to methodological choices. More recently, Cohen, 
Coval, and Pastor (2005), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2007) have developed 
other measures of skill based on holdings, returns that are not observable from SEC filings, and the correlation 
between trades and changes in analyst recommendations. 
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the returns data—returns at earnings announcements—that contain the most concentrated 
information about a firm’s earnings prospects. Second, taking as given the results of Chen et al. 
and others about the abnormal performance of trades over long horizons, the approach helps 
identify the source of such abnormal returns—whether they are due to an ability to forecast 
fundamental news released around earnings announcements or, say, proprietary technical signals. 
Of course, by definition, these benefits come at the cost of not trying to measure the total returns 
to trading skill, so the approach is best seen as a complement to traditional tests.  
The main data set merges a comprehensive sample of mutual fund portfolio holdings with 
the respective returns that each holding realized at its next quarterly earnings announcement. The 
holdings are drawn from mandatory, periodic SEC filings tabulated by Thomson Financial. For 
each fund-date-stock holding observation in these data, we merge in the stock return over the 3-
day window around the next earnings announcement. The sample of several million fund-report 
date-holding observations covers 1980 through 2005. 
We begin the analysis by tabulating the earnings announcement returns realized by fund 
holdings, but as mentioned above our main results involve fund trades. Studying trades allows 
one to difference away unobserved risk premia by comparing the subsequent performance of 
stocks that funds buy with those they sell, thus reducing Fama’s (1970) joint hypothesis problem. 
Further, trading incurs costs and perhaps the realization of capital gains, so it is likelier to be 
driven by new information than an ongoing holding. One of our main findings is that the average 
mutual fund displays stock-picking skill in that the subsequent earnings announcement returns on 
its weight-increasing stocks is significantly higher than those on its weight-decreasing stocks. 
The difference is about 10 basis points over the three-day window around the quarterly 
announcement, or, multiplying by four, about 38 annualized basis points. We also benchmark a 
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stock’s announcement returns against those earned by stocks with similar characteristics in that 
calendar quarter. The results are not much diminished, with the advantage of buys relative to 
sells falling to 9 and 34 basis points, respectively. This gap reflects skill in both buying and 
selling: Stocks bought by the average fund earn significantly higher subsequent announcement 
returns than matching stocks, while stocks sold earn lower returns than matching stocks.  
There are interesting differences in performance across funds and across time. Fund 
performance measured using earnings announcement returns tends to persist over time, and 
funds that do well are more likely to have a growth-oriented style. These patterns tend to match 
those from long-horizon studies of fund performance, supporting the view that they reflect 
information-based trading. We also consider the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which 
since October 2000 has banned the selective disclosure of corporate information to a preferred 
set of investors. After this regulation, funds have been less successful in terms of the earnings 
announcement returns of their trades, although the performance of their holdings shows no clear 
trend.  
These results support and extend the evidence of Chen et al. and others that fund trades 
are made with an element of skill. In addition, they strongly suggest that trading skill derives in 
part from skill at forecasting earnings fundamentals. To confirm this link, we test whether trades 
by mutual funds forecast quarterly earnings per share (EPS) surprises of the underlying stocks. 
They do. In 22 out of the 22 years in our sample of EPS surprise data, the EPS surprise of stocks 
that funds are buying exceeds the EPS surprise of stocks that funds are selling. Put beside the 
results from returns, it seems very clear that some portion of the abnormal returns from fund 
trades identified in prior work can be attributed to skill at forecasting fundamentals.  
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The last question we address is one of economic significance. We ask whether the 
abnormal returns to trading around earnings announcements represents a disproportionate share 
of the estimated total abnormal returns earned by stocks that funds trade. Our analysis suggests 
that it does. The point estimates are that earnings announcement returns constitute between 18% 
and 51% of the total abnormal return earned by stocks that funds trade. Or, expressed differently, 
earnings announcement days are roughly four to ten times more important than typical days in 
terms of their contribution to the abnormal performance of stocks traded by mutual funds. 
In summary, we present a new methodology that further confirms the average mutual 
fund manager has some ability to pick winners and losers, which supports and extends prior 
results; more importantly, we find that a substantial fraction of the abnormal returns earned by 
fund trades derives from skill at forecasting the economic fundamentals of firms, i.e. earnings. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews some related literature. Section III presents 
data. Section IV presents empirical results. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Related literature on trading around earnings announcements 
 We are not the first to recognize that earnings announcement returns may be useful for 
detecting informed trading. Our contribution is to apply this approach to evaluate the trading 
skill of mutual funds.  
Ali, Durtschi, Lev, and Trombley (2004) examine how changes in institutional 
ownership, broadly defined, forecasts earnings announcement returns. As this is the study most 
closely related to ours, it is worth noting some key differences. First, our N-30D data allow us to 
study performance of individual mutual funds; Ali et al. use SEC 13F data, which are aggregated 
at the institutional investor level (e.g., fund family). Second, the 13F data does not permit a 
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reliable breakdown even among aggregates such as mutual fund families and other institutions of 
perhaps less interest to retail investors: many giant fund families, such as Fidelity, Schwab, and 
Eaton Vance, are classified in an “other” category along with college endowments, pension 
funds, private foundations, hedge funds, etc. Third, Ali et al. benchmark announcement returns 
against size only, while we use a larger set of adjustments such as book-to-market, an important 
difference given that La Porta et al. (1997) find that such characteristics are associated with 
higher earnings announcement returns. These and other differences mean that our approach is 
more revealing about the stock-picking abilities of individual mutual fund managers, while Ali et 
al.’s approach is more useful for an investor who wishes to predict future returns based on recent 
changes in total institutional ownership. 
The skill of other types of investors has also been assessed from the perspective of 
earnings announcement returns. Seasholes (2004) examines this dimension of performance for 
foreign investors who trade in emerging markets. Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) track the 
earnings announcement returns that follow trading by corporate insiders. Christophe, Ferri, and 
Angel (2004) perform a similar analysis for short sellers.  
   
III. Data 
A. Data set construction 
The backbone of our data set is the mutual fund holdings data from Thomson Financial 
(also known as CDA/Spectrum S12). Thomson’s main source is the portfolio snapshot contained 
in the N-30D form each fund periodically files with the SEC. Prior to 1985, the SEC required 
each fund to report its portfolio quarterly, but starting in 1985 it required only semiannual 
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reports.2 The exact report dates are set by the fund as suits its fiscal year. At a minimum, the 
Thomson data give us semiannual snapshots of all equity holdings for essentially all mutual 
funds. A sample fund-report date-holding observation is as follows: Fidelity Magellan, as of 
March 31, 1992, held 190,000 shares of Apple Computer. Wermers (1999) describes this data set 
in detail. We extract all portfolio holdings reported between the second quarter of 1980 and the 
third quarter of 2005. Again, to be clear, we are focused on the fund-level report dates found in 
the Thomson data; the particular cut of the Thomson data, the “file date,” is not relevant for us.3  
To these holdings data we merge in earnings announcement dates from the 
CRSP/Compustat merged industrial quarterly database. Specifically, for each fund-report date-
holding observation, we merge in the first earnings announcement date that follows that 
holding’s report date.4 We drop observations for which we can find no earnings announcement 
date within 90 days after the report date. 
Next we add stock returns around each earnings announcement. From CRSP, we merge 
in the raw returns over the [-1,+1] trading day interval around each announcement. We define a 
market-adjusted event return MAR as the raw announcement return minus the contemporaneous 
return on the CRSP value-weighted market index. We also define a benchmark-adjusted event 
return BAR as the raw return minus the average [-1, +1] earnings announcement return on stocks 
                                                 
2 In February 2004, the SEC decided to return to a quarterly reporting requirement. See Elton, Gruber, and Blake 
(2007a) for a study of the performance of fund holdings using a subset of mutual funds for which Morningstar 
requested and obtained monthly holdings data. Elton, Gruber, Krasny, and Ozelge (2006) find that defining trades 
based on changes in quarterly holdings misses 20% of the trades revealed by changes in the Morningstar monthly 
data. The benefit of the quarterly holdings data is that it covers a far broader set of funds than Morningstar. 
3 The only reason to care about the file date is that Thomson practice is to report the number of shares including the 
effect of any splits that occur between the fund’s report date and the file date. To recover the currect number of 
shares as of the report date, we undo the effect of such splits using CRSP share adjustment factors.  
 
4 Prior to this merge, we create placeholder observations for “liquidating” observations in the holdings data set, i.e. 
situations in which no holdings of a given stock are reported in the current report date but positive holdings were 
reported at the prior report date. This allows us to examine whether closing a position entirely portends especially 
poor earnings announcement returns.  
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of similar book-to-market, size, and momentum that also announced earnings in the same 
calendar quarter as the holding in question. Our approach is similar to that in Daniel et al. 
(1997).5 We exclude fund-report dates that do not have at least one benchmark-adjusted earnings 
announcement return; our results are unchanged if we restrict attention to fund-report dates 
containing at least 10 or at least 20 such returns. 
For a subset of the remaining observations, we can obtain fund characteristics data. Russ 
Wermers and WRDS provided links between the Thomson holdings data and the CRSP mutual 
fund database, as described in Wermers (2000). From the CRSP mutual fund data we take 
investment objective codes as well as total net assets, turnover, and expense ratios.6 Christopher 
Blake shared the data on incentive fees, originally from Lipper, as studied in Elton, Gruber, and 
Blake (2003). Fee structures are similar across the funds that use them, so we simply study 
whether the fund has an incentive fee in place.  
Finally, we apply a set of screens to obtain an appropriate sample. Based on keywords in 
the name of the fund and on reported investment objectives, we exclude funds that cannot be 
predominantly characterized as actively managed U.S. equity funds, such as index, bond, 
international, and precious metals funds. We exclude funds with less than $10 million in net 
                                                 
5 Specifically, we form the value-weighted average earnings announcement return for each of 125 benchmark 
portfolios (5x5x5 sorts on book-to-market, size, and momentum) each calendar quarter. Book-to-market is defined 
following Fama and French (1995). Market value of equity is computed using the CRSP monthly file as the close 
times shares outstanding as of December of the calendar year preceding the fiscal year data. The book-to-market 
ratio is then matched from fiscal years ending in year (t-1) to earnings announcement returns starting in July of year 
(t) and from fiscal years ending in (t-2) to earnings announcement returns in January through June of year (t). Size is 
matched from June of calendar year (t) to returns starting in July of year (t) through June of year (t+1). Momentum 
is the return from month t-12 through month t-2. The breakpoints to determine the quintiles on book-to-market, size, 
and momentum are NYSE-based. The benchmark portfolios include only stocks with positive book equity that are 
ordinary common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 or 11).  
6 Turnover data for 1991 is missing in the CRSP database. Also, CRSP sometimes reports several classes of shares 
for a given fund, corresponding to different fee structures for the same portfolio of stocks (e.g. A, B, C, institutional, 
no-load). In these cases, we take the highest reported value for turnover across all classes to use as the value for 
turnover, and the value-weighted average of expenses across all classes as the value for the expense ratio. 
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asset value. We also exclude each fund’s first report date, as some of our analysis requires lagged 
portfolio weights. 
B.  Summary statistics 
Our final sample consists of several million fund-report date-holding observations with 
associated earnings announcement returns, spread across 110,236 fund-report dates. Table 1 
shows summary statistics. In the first column, the number of funds has increased dramatically 
over the sample period. Almost half of the useable fund-report dates are in the last five years. 
The next three columns show the distribution of investment objectives.  The subsequent five 
columns show fund holdings and trading activity. For the average fund-report date we are able to 
identify and benchmark 90.0 holdings. Portfolio breadth has increased steadily over time. On 
average, 54.0 holdings receive an increase in weight in the portfolio over that in the prior report, 
of which 18.7 are first buys. 53.1 holdings receive a decrease in weight, on average, and 17.0 of 
these decrease to zero. We also distinguish the performance of first buys and last sells since it is 
particularly clear that these reflect a deliberate trading decision. 
The last columns summarize fund characteristics. Fund size is the total market value of 
the fund’s reported equity holdings for which we also have earnings announcement return data. 
Average size peaks at $85.5 million in 1999. Turnover is available for 71% of the sample, 
averages 96.6 percent per year for the sub-sample for which it is available, and increases through 
2000 and then falls somewhat. The expense ratio is available for about 76 percent of the sample, 
averages 1.27 percent per year for the sub-sample for which it is available, and increases by 42 
basis points over the period. The last column shows the percentage of funds using incentive fees. 
In the average year, 1.9 percent of funds use fees. Elton et al. (2003) report that these funds 
9 
account for around 10 percent of all mutual fund assets. Some of these characteristics display 
trends, so we sort funds into quintiles within each reporting period in some analyses. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Earnings announcement returns of holdings 
We start by summarizing the average performance of mutual fund holdings around 
earnings announcements. For reasons discussed in the Introduction we are most interested in 
subsequent earnings announcement performance of stocks that funds trade, not just continue to 
hold, but starting with holdings allows us to develop the methodology step by step.  
The first column of Table 2 reports the average raw return over the three-day window 
around earnings announcement dates. Specifically, we take the equal-weighted average earnings 
announcement return for each fund-report date, annualize it (multiplying by 4), average these 
across all fund-report dates within each calendar quarter from 1980Q1 through 2005Q3, and, 
finally, average the quarterly averages. That is, the average raw return of 1.16 is: 
(1)                                     , 
where i indexes mutual funds from 1 to N, j indexes the holdings of mutual fund i from 1 to Ki, 
and t measures days around the earnings announcement of stock ij.7  
We treat each quarterly average as a single data point in computing an overall average. 
We compute the standard deviation of the quarterly averages to give a t-statistic of 3.6. This is in 
the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Taking simple averages across the pooled data, which 
gives more weight to the last five years of the sample, leads to similar conclusions.  
                                                 
7 Because the sample starts in the second quarter of 1980 and ends in the third quarter of 2005, the average return for 
1980 is for the last three quarters while the average return for 2005 is the first three quarters. 
10 
The second and third columns adjust the raw returns. The second column reports market-
adjusted returns (MAR), where we subtract the CRSP value-weighted market return over the 
earnings announcement window. The average MAR of 0.56 is: 
(2)                                   . 
Based on the standard deviation of the quarterly averages, the t-statistic here is 4.7. 
The third column shows a benchmark-adjusted return (BAR), where each holding is 
matched to one of 125 benchmark portfolios by quintiles of size, book-to-market, and 
momentum. That is, the benchmark portfolios contain the value-weighted, matched-firm average 
earnings announcement return in that calendar quarter. The average BAR of 0.04 is then: 
(3)                          , 
where l indexes the matched firms within the quarter where t equals zero, wl is the market value 
weight of stock l in the characteristics-matched portfolio, and sl measures days around the 
earnings announcement of stock l within the matched quarter. Note that in Eq. (3) the earnings 
announcement return and the benchmark do not overlap exactly.  
BAR controls for the high average return in earnings announcement periods documented 
by Beaver (1968) and studied recently by Frazzini and Lamont (2007). Also, this procedure 
removes some known associations between earnings announcement returns and firm 
characteristics. Chari et al. (1988) and La Porta et al. (1997) find that small, high book-to-market 
firms tend to have higher announcement returns. BAR controls for these effects. In allowing the 
benchmark return to vary from quarter to quarter, it also controls for a “good earnings quarter for 
small value stocks,” for example, and thus may more precisely pick up stock-selection skill. 
Obviously, it would also be a valuable skill to be able to predict abnormal returns at the “style” 
level, or to recognize and exploit the positive autocorrelation in abnormal announcement returns. 
11 
BAR does not pick up these dimensions of skill, so it is conservative. But a conservative measure 
of stock-picking ability seems appropriate given that one of our goals is to confirm the existence 
of such skill. 
Table 2 shows that mutual funds earn, on an equal-weighted average basis, 1.16 percent 
per year from the twelve trading days surrounding their holdings’ earnings announcements. This 
exceeds the corresponding market return by 56 basis points, and so is an outsize average return 
compared to non-announcement days. The raw annualized announcement return earned by the 
average fund manager is not significantly larger than that earned on a portfolio of firms with 
matching characteristics: the average BAR is an insignificant 4 basis points. Similar conclusions 
obtain when holdings are value-weighted in each fund-report date. 
To the extent that the BAR accurately measures the unexpected release of information, 
then the average mutual fund, as measured by all of its holdings, does not appear to possess 
stock-picking ability. This would be consistent with the message of Jensen (1968) and many 
other studies on portfolio-level returns. But the conclusion that mutual fund managers do not 
have any skill is clearly premature. A subset may have skill, even if the average does not. Or, 
funds may hold many stocks for which they once had good information but now retain because 
of transaction costs or a capital gains tax overhang, an effect which would reduce the power of 
the tests. We turn to these possibilities. 
 
B. Cross-sectional and time-series patterns in earnings announcement returns of holdings 
We next look for patterns in the cross-sectional distribution and time-series distribution 
of holdings-based performance measures. Under the null hypothesis of no skill, no patterns 
should be apparent. The first dimension we sort funds on is past performance. The persistence of 
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longer-horizon return performance has been studied by Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), 
Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996), and others. Do funds that had 
high earnings announcement alphas in the past continue to have them in the future? 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of tests for persistence. We sort funds each year 
from 1983 to 2005 into quintiles based on the average announcement return, or the average BAR 
alpha, that they earned over their previous eight announcements. We then compare the 
subsequent annualized announcement returns and BAR alphas of funds in the top quintile of 
prior performance to those in the bottom quintile. The first columns show the mean equal-
weighted return and BAR alpha, as well as t-statistics.  
The earnings announcement alphas show some persistence both in raw and benchmark-
adjusted returns. When sorted by prior equal-weighted BAR, the subsequent equal-weighted 
BAR rises monotonically. The difference between the top and bottom quintiles is a statistically 
significant 43 basis points per year. The fact that persistence is present in BAR, i.e., even after 
adjustments are made for size, book-to-market, and momentum, indicates that performance 
persistence cannot be explained by persistence in characteristics-adjusted announcement returns 
alone.8 Value-weighted results display a similar but weaker pattern, suggesting, quite sensibly, 
that it is easier to pick future earnings winners among smaller stocks. 
The remaining panels of Table 3 look at how performance is correlated with fund 
characteristics or the regulatory environment. Panel B considers investment objective, including 
growth, growth and income, and income styles. A clear pattern emerges. Growth funds earn 
higher earnings announcement returns than growth and income funds, which in turn earn higher 
                                                 
8 In an earlier draft, we formed benchmark portfolios where the “momentum” measure was earnings announcement 
return momentum, not total momentum as in Chen et al. (2000). This approach controls for the Bernard and Thomas 
(1989) finding of persistence in earnings announcement returns. In magnitude and statistical significance, the results 
from that approach are virtually identical to those reported here.   
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returns than income funds. The same pattern is as strong, or stronger, in BAR alphas. Indeed, the 
BAR on the portfolio of growth funds is positive, while the BAR on income funds is negative. 
Wald tests (unreported) reject both that the average return for each category is equal to zero and 
that the average return is equal across categories. Comparing each style to the equal-weighted 
average of the other two reveals that income funds perform significantly worse than other 
categories. Similarly, growth funds perform better. These results are consistent with Grinblatt 
and Titman (1989, 1993) and Daniel et al. (1997), who also find the strongest evidence of stock-
selection ability among growth funds, and thus indicate that these earlier patterns from long-
horizon studies can be attributed to information-based trading with some confidence. 
Panel C examines returns by fund size quintiles. There is a hint that performance around 
earnings announcements increases with fund size: the smallest quintile does the worst. The 
finding that small funds make superior trades is opposite to the arguments of Chen, Hong, 
Huang, and Kubik (2004), who study the long-horizon returns of large and small funds.  
So far, we have seen that funds with high earnings announcement alphas can be identified 
from past performance (in this respect), style, and size. One possibility is that differential 
performance is associated with, or perhaps facilitated by, higher expenses. This is not the case. 
Expense ratios bear little relation to performance. We omit a tabular presentation for brevity, but 
are results are consistent with, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999), who also find no positive 
relationship between raw performance and expenses. However, Panel D shows modest evidence 
that high earnings announcement alphas are associated with high turnover, consistent with the 
superior performance of short-term institutions found in Yan and Zhang (2007). 
Panel E considers the effect of incentive fees. By all measures of earnings announcement 
alpha, funds with incentive fees perform better. The statistical significance of the difference is 
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marginal, but the results generally reinforce the earlier long-horizon results of Elton, Gruber, and 
Blake (2003), tying them more closely to information-based trading.  
In Panel F we examine fund managers’ performance before and after the introduction of 
“Reg FD.” In October 2000, SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure banned selective disclosure, i.e. the 
practice of disclosing material information to preferred analysts and other institutional investors 
before the general public.9 A motivation for Reg FD was the claim that “… those who were privy 
to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those 
kept in the dark” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2000, p.2)). If selective disclosure 
contributed to fund managers’ ability to pick stocks, then we may expect that the returns earned 
around subsequent earnings announcements will drop in the post-Reg FD era. The results based 
on all holdings in Table 3, however, show no clear evidence of such an effect.  
 
C. Earnings announcement returns following trades  
Our central analysis involves the earnings announcement returns of stocks that funds 
trade. Trading involves transaction costs and perhaps the realization of capital gains, so it is a 
stronger signal than merely continuing to hold. Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) study the 
longer-horizon returns of traded stocks. We are interested in whether the abnormal returns that 
they document for stocks that funds trade is disproportionately concentrated around earnings 
announcements. This would shed important light on the origins of fund managers’ trading skill.10 
Table 4 repeats the analysis from Table 2 but computes announcement returns only for 
holdings whose portfolio weight changed between the current and the previous report dates. The 
                                                 
9 See Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira (2005) for a fuller discussion of the debates surrounding Reg FD, as well as 
empirical evidence that Reg FD increased analysts’ earnings forecast errors and the volatility of stock returns around 
earnings announcements. 
10 Also note that if an earnings announcement event “risk premium” exists, it is differenced away in the comparison 
of buys versus sells. 
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first three pairs of columns show equal-weighted raw and benchmark-adjusted returns for 
holdings whose weight increased or decreased. The second three pairs of columns focus only on 
first buys, i.e., when a fund moves from zero to a positive holding of the stock, and last sells, i.e., 
when a fund closed out the position.  
Table 4 contains the main results of the paper. Stocks in which funds have been 
increasing weight earn 16 annualized basis points more around their next earnings announcement 
than matched stocks. In addition, stocks in which mutual funds have decreased their weight earn 
19 annual basis points less than matched stocks. Neither effect is large in economic terms, 
reflecting both the strict matching adjustment and the focus of the approach on a small event 
window. Nonetheless, the effects are present even in the full sample, thus even the average 
mutual fund is at least somewhat successful both in buying subsequent outperformers and in 
selling subsequent underperformers. Reflecting the combined influence of the two effects, the 
BAR of weight increases minus decreases is positive in most years and statistically significant.  
As expected, trades that are “first buys” and “last sells” give an even clearer indication of 
skilled trading. The average mutual fund’s first buys subsequently earn 21 basis points more than 
matching stocks, while its last sells subsequently earn 26 basis points less. The former effect is 
marginally significant, while the latter effect, and the difference between the two, is more robust. 
An interesting note is that the table indicates that the difference in raw announcement returns 
between buys and sells is quite close to the difference in BARs, 0.38 versus 0.34. This is not just 
a coincidence of the averages; the link is tight year after year. What this means is that the bulk of 
the total difference between buys and sells is due to picking winners and losers within 
characteristic groupings, not to rebalancing toward the characteristics that are associated with 
better subsequent announcement returns.  
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D. Cross-sectional and time-series patterns in earnings announcement returns of trades 
Table 5 looks for patterns in the performance of trades, following our earlier analyses of 
holdings. Once again we start with persistence in Panel A. For each of the six trade-based BAR 
alpha measures and the six raw return measures, we sort funds into quintiles based on their 
previous performance over the past two years, and then tabulate their subsequent performance. 
The results in Panel A show evidence of persistence, in particular for measures based on weight 
increases, weight decreases, or the difference. The gap between the BAR of the highest and 
lowest weight increase quintiles is a significant 24 basis points, and the gap for weight decreases 
is an even larger 41 basis points. (Recall that sorting across quintiles has the opposite 
interpretation for weight increases and decreases. For weight increases, a high BAR indicates 
forecasting skill. For decreases, a low BAR indicates skill.  Because the sorting variables differ, 
the difference between the weight increase and weight decrease columns will not equal the 
column with weight increases minus decreases.) However, there is little evidence of persistence 
in relative performance of first buys, last sells, and first buys minus last sells, likely because both 
classifications and outcomes based on first buys or last sells are much noisier, there being far 
fewer such trades than generic buys or sells.  
 The next several panels sort on other fund characteristics. The effects are typically in the 
same direction as the results from holdings. In cases where there is a performance difference, 
growth funds outperform income funds. Wald tests (unreported) usually reject the hypothesis of 
equality. Larger funds are better at buying at the right time, while smaller funds have an edge in 
terms of pruning their portfolios of soon-to-be weak performers. Again, the patterns are harder to 
discern in the first buys and last sells, most likely due to greater noise. High turnover funds may 
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have a slight advantage, but as in the holding analysis the pattern is quite weak. We have also 
confirmed that expense ratios do not matter (unreported). Last, the point estimates are in the 
direction of incentive fees motivating managers, but none is statistically significant. 
 We also look again at Reg FD. The trades-based performance is a sharper test of the 
hypothesis that mutual fund managers tended to benefit from selective disclosure, and that Reg 
FD crimped this advantage. Funds generally hold dozens of positions, and in any given quarter 
only a subset would be the subject of selectively-disclosed information that might inspire trades. 
And, interestingly, the results here suggest that Reg FD may indeed have had teeth.11 Since the 
introduction of this regulation, mutual funds have been less successful in terms of both buys and 
sells. Where the average BAR difference between weight increases and decreases was 49 basis 
points prior to 2001, the point estimate has actually turned negative, at -24 basis points, since 
Reg FD, a statistically significant drop. Additional years of data will determine whether the 
decline in performance is permanent or just sampling error, but at this point the evidence is 
consistent with Reg FD having reduced fund managers’ ability to make profitable trades.   
 
E. EPS surprises following trades 
 Here we ask whether trades by mutual funds forecast quarterly EPS surprises of the 
underlying stocks. This would provide further evidence that the nature of fund managers’ 
apparent informational advantage derives, at least in part, from an ability to forecast earnings 
fundamentals. We define the earnings announcement surprise as the difference between the 
actual and consensus earnings per share (EPS), scaled by the share price prevailing at the 
                                                 
11 In a recent working paper, Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2008) also find evidence of decreasing active 
management skills over the previous decade.    
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beginning of the forecast period. Consensus and actual EPS are taken from the IBES summary 
file. The first year for which we have sufficient data is 1984.  
Note that in the setting of EPS surprises there is no benchmark or BAR-type adjustment 
that is natural or necessary. However, EPS surprise data involve complications of their own. The 
most important one to address is the optimism bias in consensus forecasts documented by, e.g., 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003). We correct for this bias by differencing it away, comparing the 
EPS surprise performance of buys versus sells. This is analogous to our earlier approach of 
comparing the return performance of buys and sells and thereby differenced away any rational 
risk premium during earnings announcement periods that may otherwise contaminate estimates. 
A smaller issue with the EPS data is the presence of outliers. We handle this by Winsorizing at 
the top and bottom percentile, following Abarbanell and Lehavy.  
We repeat the analysis of Table 4 but use the EPS surprise as the dependent variable. 
Table 6 shows the results by trade type and year. Consistent with prior results on optimism in 
consensus EPS forecasts, the average stock held by fund managers experiences a negative EPS 
surprise: Both weight increases and decreases, which together encompass all holdings, portend a 
negative EPS surprise on average. The meaningful comparison is the difference between buys 
and sells, and here the results are clear.  In every year in our sample, the EPS surprise of stocks 
experiencing weight increases exceeds that of stocks experiencing decreases. The results are 
similarly strong in comparing first buys minus last sells.  
The EPS-based results provide a different perspective on trading skill, but they are not 
orthogonal from the results based on returns. This is apparent from the strong positive correlation 
between these measures. The average EPS surprise of weight increases relative to decreases (the 
third column of Table 6) has a correlation of 0.37 (p=0.09, n=22) with the returns of weight 
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increases minus decreases (the fifth column of Table 4) and a correlation of 0.52 (p=0.01, n=22) 
with the relative BAR returns of weight increases minus decreases (the sixth column of Table 4). 
The analogous correlations involving first buys and last sells also exceed 0.35 (p=0.10, n=22). 
These correlations provide further evidence that the returns-based results reflect skilled trading 
by mutual fund managers that is due to an ability to forecast earnings-related fundamentals.  
 
F. Other interpretations 
 Where do mutual fund managers get the information to predicting earnings 
announcement returns? Presumably from many disparate sources. One interesting and nefarious 
possibility, suggested in Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2008), is that they are “tipped off” about 
forthcoming recommendation changes by analysts at the brokerage firms that benefit from fund 
managers’ trades. In unreported results, we find that mutual fund trades indeed predict consensus 
recommendation changes in the same direction, although the economic magnitude is modest.12 
However, we also find that fund trades predict earnings announcement returns even in a sample 
where there are no recommendation changes in the meantime and thus no “tips.”  If anything our 
results are stronger in this subsample.  
 Another related possibility is that fund managers are responding to (not just predicting) 
some analysts’ forecasts. Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2007) show that analyst forecast revisions 
indeed generate mutual fund trades. If the stock market underreacts to forecast revisions, this 
would give rise to the appearance of fund manager trading skill and potentially our results. (We 
would be inclined to classify such a story as skilled trading by fund managers in response to new 
information—new information has arisen, managers have recognized a market underreaction, 
                                                 
12 While consistent with tipping, this result is also consistent with a simpler explanation that both analysts and fund 
managers are reacting to the same external source of value-relevant information, with some fund managers 
executing trades before analysts are able to revise their forecasts.  
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and they have traded accordingly.) Analyst forecast revisions may indeed be one source of fund 
managers’ information. But the fact that fund managers’ trades predict earnings surprises relative 
to the prevailing-at-announcement consensus forecasts, in Table 6, suggests that their trades 
embody incremental information that goes beyond anything analysts have produced.  
 
G. Economic significance: Earnings announcement window versus full-quarter returns 
 We close with some remarks on economic significance. We ask whether the abnormal 
returns to skilled trading around earnings announcements represents a disproportionate a fraction 
of the estimated total abnormal returns to earned by the stocks that funds trade. To measure the 
latter quantity, we adapt the metholdology of Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000). We repeat 
our prior tests but replace the average earnings announcement return with the average total 
return. As in our earlier tests, and as in Chen et al., we use the Daniel et al. (1997) size, book-to-
market, and momentum portfolios as benchmarks. Table 7 presents the earnings announcement 
return performance of trades, repeated for convenience from Table 4, beside their total returns.  
 We find moderate evidence of outperformance of fund trades in terms of total returns. 
Chen et al. find stronger effects. The difference may be due to our sample period (the Chen et al. 
sample begins in 1975 and ends in 1995) and, relatedly, the fact that our sample includes the 
apparently deleterious effect of Reg FD. Also, Chen et al. divide stocks more finely into deciles 
of changes in mutual fund ownership and study the extreme deciles, while we define trades more 
coarsely. However, even in our sample and using our definitions, the total return performance of 
first buys and last sells is noteworthy. In any event, for our purpose the main requirement is 
simply to assemble an apples-to-apples comparison between performance in total returns and 
returns around earnings announcements.  
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The bottom rows of Table 7 make this comparison more formally. With 250 total trading 
days per year and four, three-day earnings announcement windows, the null hypothesis is that the 
annualized average earnings announcement abnormal returns equals 12/250 or 5% of the 
annualized total abnormal return. The results indicate that the abnormal returns following fund 
trades are indeed disproportionately concentrated around earnings announcements. Depending on 
methodology, the earnings announcement return of fund trades constitutes between 18% and 
51% of the total return. Or, put differently, dividing these percentages by 5%, the estimates 
imply that earnings announcement days are roughly four to ten times more important than typical 
days in terms of their contribution to total outperformance of stocks that funds trade.  
 
V. Summary 
 We use the subsequent earnings announcement returns of stocks that funds hold and trade 
to measure mutual fund manager trading skill. We find that the stocks that U.S. equity funds buy 
perform better at future earnings announcements than control stocks, while the stocks that funds 
sell perform worse. Fund trades predict not just earnings announcement returns but also EPS 
surprises. The point estimates indicate that a meaningful fraction of the total abnormal return 
performance of fund trades documented by Chen et al. (2000), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), and 
Wermers (1999), among others, is concentrated around earnings announcement periods. Overall, 
the results provide additional evidence of trading ability of mutual funds and shed new light on 
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TABLE 1 
Summary statistics, 1980Q2 through 2005Q3 
The sample is the intersection of the Spectrum Mutual Fund holdings database, Compustat, and CRSP. To be included in the sample, a mutual fund holding must 
have matched earnings announcement date and book value from CRSP, and a valid return, market value of equity (price times shares outstanding), past 
momentum (return from months t-12 through t-2), and three-day return in the earnings announcement window from CRSP. We compute terminal holdings for 
stocks that exit the portfolio. Where possible, we include the investment objective from the CRSP mutual fund database as determined by CDA Weisenberger or 
S&P. The investment objective growth includes codes G, MCG, and LTG from CDA and codes LG and AG from S&P. The investment objective growth and 
income includes G-I and GCI from CDA and GI and IN from S&P. The investment objective income includes I, IEQ, and IFL from CDA and IN from S&P. We 
classify each holding as a weight increase or weight decrease. We also record those weight increases that are first buy (from zero to positive weight), and those 
weight decreases that are last sells (from positive weight to zero). We measure fund size as the total market value (price times shares outstanding) of its reported 
equity holdings; fund turnover and fund expense ratio from the CRSP mutual fund database; and incentive fees (whether or not the fund has such a structure) 
from Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) and Lipper. Turnover is missing in CRSP in 1991.  
 Fund-Report Date Observations Average Fund Activity Fund Characteristics 
Year All Growth 
Growth& 

















1980 828 385 116 22 49.9 27.5 28.7 7.0 6.4 14.2 72.9 0.89 0.6 
1981 1,107 480 148 23 50.0 29.8 27.2 6.7 7.0 13.7 68.4 0.84 1.3 
1982 908 421 132 26 51.0 30.1 29.6 9.1 8.6 14.3 72.6 0.88 1.7 
1983 1,082 507 153 47 57.2 32.1 34.4 10.5 9.3 20.1 75.0 0.88 1.8 
1984 1,233 568 185 58 57.8 33.8 33.8 9.9 9.9 18.3 71.2 0.91 1.6 
1985 1,375 647 211 81 58.7 34.6 34.2 11.1 10.1 21.2 80.5 0.92 1.8 
1986 1,556 727 247 139 60.1 35.0 36.0 11.8 10.9 25.6 78.6 0.94 1.9 
1987 1,753 843 285 155 62.2 36.2 37.7 12.7 11.7 31.3 94.5 1.00 2.3 
1988 1,853 915 308 147 63.8 38.1 35.7 10.9 9.9 26.3 82.2 1.14 2.3 
1989 1,892 954 284 140 64.2 37.9 37.1 11.9 10.7 28.9 77.5 1.14 1.7 
1990 2,028 896 371 121 64.2 36.9 38.4 11.1 11.2 27.7 88.2 1.16 1.8 
1991 2,253 1,025 400 118 67.1 37.9 40.8 12.9 11.6 32.4  1.06 1.7 
1992 2,492 1,038 502 178 72.0 41.0 43.6 13.1 12.6 39.3 79.5 1.22 2.4 
1993 2,688 1,144 454 148 79.9 45.1 49.3 16.2 14.5 45.6 79.4 1.22 2.4 
1994 3,237 1,252 489 151 81.0 47.6 50.3 18.4 16.9 39.6 81.6 1.21 2.0 
1995 3,428 1,371 519 143 85.4 51.1 53.7 21.5 19.4 49.8 88.5 1.24 2.0 
1996 3,938 1,628 579 158 84.8 51.4 53.8 22.1 20.4 56.4 91.6 1.28 2.1 
1997 4,819 2,087 659 182 87.0 54.4 53.1 23.1 20.5 66.6 91.2 1.27 1.7 
1998 5,068 2,326 738 216 88.0 53.3 54.6 21.4 19.9 81.2 89.0 1.28 1.8 
1999 6,168 2,619 756 222 85.9 50.2 53.5 20.6 17.8 85.5 87.1 1.30 1.6 
2000 8,414 2,929 826 193 91.3 56.0 52.9 19.9 17.6 82.4 118.9 1.29 1.5 
2001 8,608 2,819 796 150 96.3 60.1 55.1 21.8 18.8 60.8 117.0 1.32 1.6 
2002 9,755 3,295 876 185 101.3 62.8 58.1 21.3 19.6 52.6 114.2 1.38 1.9 
2003 10,913 3,912 995 464 103.6 61.3 61.0 20.3 18.7 51.1 112.5 1.39 2.0 
2004 12,775 4,178 1,031 493 106.5 64.6 60.2 19.3 18.3 65.1 110.1 1.38 2.4 
2005 10,065 3,130 792 350 108.0 62.6 63.0 18.9 17.5 67.6 86.8 1.31 1.5 
              
All 110,236 42,096 12,852 4,310 90.0 54.0 53.1 18.7 17.0 56.6 96.6 1.27 1.9 
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TABLE 2 
Annualized announcement effects 
For each periodic mutual fund holdings report, we compute the average subsequent quarterly earnings 
announcement return: raw, market-adjusted, and benchmark-adjusted; and equal- and value-weighted across all 
holdings by fund. The characteristics benchmark return is the corresponding 5x5x5 size, book-to-market, and 
momentum average earnings announcement return in the matched quarter. We  annualize these returns (multiplying 
by four) and average across all funds within a year. T-statistics in brackets are based on quarterly means and 
standard deviations thereof. Returns are Winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. 
 
 EW Earnings Announcement Alpha VW Earnings Announcement Alpha 
Year Return MAR BAR Return MAR BAR 
1980 1.00 -0.27 0.00 0.91 -0.35 0.23 
1981 0.53 0.49 -0.26 0.84 0.78 -0.01 
1982 1.29 0.23 0.49 1.22 0.29 0.50 
1983 -0.37 0.21 0.25 -0.45 0.13 0.28 
1984 1.37 -0.16 0.41 1.44 -0.03 0.52 
1985 1.04 -0.41 -0.15 1.28 -0.11 0.11 
1986 1.88 0.38 0.27 2.03 0.63 0.40 
1987 -2.25 0.34 -0.76 -2.20 0.45 -0.80 
1988 0.06 -0.13 -0.73 0.21 0.04 -0.54 
1989 0.04 -0.50 0.15 0.19 -0.35 0.26 
1990 1.55 0.51 0.01 1.66 0.59 0.16 
1991 1.32 0.74 -0.31 1.15 0.53 -0.35 
1992 1.83 0.68 -0.22 1.66 0.56 -0.21 
1993 0.69 0.74 0.05 0.61 0.65 0.04 
1994 0.92 0.38 -0.42 0.97 0.47 -0.34 
1995 2.24 0.76 -0.31 2.16 0.78 -0.29 
1996 2.63 1.65 -0.09 2.61 1.71 -0.02 
1997 3.02 1.14 0.18 2.90 1.18 0.18 
1998 1.63 0.41 0.38 1.59 0.36 0.37 
1999 3.10 2.46 0.84 3.03 2.47 0.83 
2000 -0.76 0.42 1.58 -0.75 0.50 1.48 
2001 2.49 0.86 -0.62 2.14 0.64 -0.46 
2002 0.34 0.91 -0.28 0.55 1.11 0.05 
2003 2.23 1.38 0.17 1.94 1.05 -0.04 
2004 0.62 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.31 0.12 
2005 1.89 1.07 -0.02 1.67 0.97 -0.19 
       
Avg 1.16 0.56 0.04 1.14 0.59 0.09 
[t] [3.6] [4.7] [0.5] [3.8] [5.6] [1.3] 
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TABLE 3 
Annualized announcement effects: Fund characteristics 
For each periodic mutual fund holdings report, we compute the average subsequent quarterly earnings 
announcement return: raw and benchmark-adjusted; and equal- and value-weighted across all holdings by fund. The 
characteristics benchmark return is the corresponding 5x5x5 size, book-to-market, and momentum average earnings 
announcement return in the matched quarter. We annualize these returns (multiplying by four) and average across all 
funds by past performance quintile (past returns), investment objective (style), total market value of reported 
holdings (fund size), turnover, incentive fee structure, and before and after Reg FD for each report date. For past 
returns, size, and turnover, quintiles go from lowest to highest. Past performance is defined based on the previous 
eight holdings reports for the corresponding definition of performance. T-statistics are in brackets. Returns are 
Winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. 
 EW Earnings Announcement Alpha VW Earnings Announcement Alpha 
 Return [t] BAR [t] Return [t] BAR [t] 
Quintile Panel A. Past Returns 
1 1.02 [ 2.9] -0.15 [-1.7] 1.07 [ 3.3] -0.04 [-0.5] 
2 1.22 [ 3.7] -0.01 [-0.1] 1.14 [ 3.6] -0.05 [-0.7] 
3 1.27 [ 3.6] 0.11 [ 1.3] 1.22 [ 3.7] 0.12 [ 1.5] 
4 1.35 [ 3.8] 0.14 [ 1.4] 1.30 [ 3.9] 0.15 [ 1.7] 
5 1.41 [ 3.7] 0.28 [ 2.2] 1.30 [ 3.6] 0.24 [ 1.8] 
5-1 0.39 [ 3.9] 0.43 [ 4.2] 0.23 [ 1.8] 0.28 [ 2.4] 
Style Panel B. Style 
G 1.26 [ 3.6] 0.16 [ 1.4] 1.23 [ 3.8] 0.20 [ 2.0] 
G&I 1.19 [ 3.9] 0.00 [-0.0] 1.14 [ 3.8] -0.01 [-0.1] 
I 0.89 [ 3.0] -0.31 [-2.9] 0.89 [ 3.1] -0.26 [-2.5] 
G,<G&I,I> 0.22 [ 1.5] 0.32 [ 2.7] 0.22 [ 1.6] 0.33 [ 2.8] 
G&I,<G,I> 0.11 [ 1.7] 0.07 [ 1.2] 0.08 [ 1.2] 0.02 [ 0.4] 
I,<G,G&I> -0.34 [-2.6] -0.39 [-3.5] -0.30 [-2.4] -0.35 [-3.3] 
Quintile Panel C. Size 
1 1.07 [ 3.2] -0.07 [-1.0] 1.04 [ 3.4] -0.01 [-0.2] 
2 1.16 [ 3.6] 0.03 [ 0.3] 1.12 [ 3.8] 0.06 [ 0.9] 
3 1.16 [ 3.4] 0.05 [ 0.5] 1.16 [ 3.7] 0.12 [ 1.3] 
4 1.20 [ 3.6] 0.09 [ 0.9] 1.18 [ 3.8] 0.12 [ 1.3] 
5 1.24 [ 3.8] 0.10 [ 1.2] 1.24 [ 4.0] 0.14 [ 1.8] 
5-1 0.17 [ 3.0] 0.17 [ 3.0] 0.20 [ 3.0] 0.15 [ 2.4] 
Quintile Panel D. Turnover 
1 1.17 [ 3.7] 0.02 [ 0.3] 1.20 [ 4.0] 0.09 [ 1.3] 
2 1.17 [ 3.6] 0.06 [ 0.8] 1.16 [ 3.7] 0.09 [ 1.3] 
3 1.13 [ 3.2] 0.04 [ 0.4] 1.11 [ 3.4] 0.08 [ 0.9] 
4 1.23 [ 3.4] 0.14 [ 1.2] 1.20 [ 3.6] 0.16 [ 1.5] 
5 1.33 [ 3.5] 0.24 [ 1.7] 1.26 [ 3.6] 0.22 [ 1.7] 
5-1 0.16 [ 1.1] 0.22 [ 1.7] 0.07 [ 0.5] 0.14 [ 1.1] 
Fees Panel E. Incentive Fees 
Yes 1.26 [ 3.6] 0.19 [ 1.6] 1.33 [ 3.9] 0.25 [ 2.0] 
No 1.16 [ 3.5] 0.04 [ 0.4] 1.15 [ 3.8] 0.08 [ 1.1] 
Yes-No 0.10 [ 1.0] 0.15 [ 1.8] 0.18 [ 1.5] 0.17 [ 1.6] 
RegFD Panel F. Regulation FD 
Pre 1.08 [ 3.2] 0.06 [ 0.7] 1.10 [ 3.4] 0.13 [ 1.6] 
Post 1.49 [ 1.7] -0.08 [-0.5] 1.32 [ 1.7] -0.10 [-1.0] 
Pre-Post -0.41 [-0.5] 0.15 [ 0.7] -0.22 [-0.3] 0.23 [ 1.3] 
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TABLE 4 
Annualized announcement effects: Mutual fund trades 
For each periodic mutual fund holdings report, we compute the average subsequent quarterly earnings announcement returns: raw and benchmark-adjusted; and 
equal-weighted across weight increases, weight decreases, long weight increases and short weight decreases, first buys, last sells, and long first buys and short 
last sells by fund. The characteristics benchmark return is the corresponding 5x5x5 size, book-to-market, and momentum average earnings announcement return 
in the matched quarter. We annualize these returns (multiplying by four) and average across all funds within a year. T-statistics in brackets are based on quarterly 
means and standard deviations thereof. Returns are Winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. 
 
 Weight Increases Weight Decreases Increases-Decreases First Buys Last Sells First Buys-Last Sells 
Year Return BAR Return BAR Return BAR Return BAR Return BAR Return BAR 
1980 1.48 0.67 -0.28 -1.00 1.76 1.67 0.45 0.41 -0.98 -0.90 1.44 1.31 
1981 0.77 0.12 0.28 -0.70 0.50 0.82 0.21 -0.34 -0.50 -1.25 0.71 0.92 
1982 1.87 0.98 0.33 -0.30 1.54 1.28 3.01 2.12 0.40 -0.27 2.60 2.39 
1983 -0.20 0.38 -0.56 0.00 0.36 0.38 0.04 0.48 -1.06 -0.74 1.10 1.23 
1984 1.35 0.37 1.20 0.26 0.15 0.11 1.20 0.24 0.51 -0.40 0.69 0.65 
1985 1.21 0.03 0.84 -0.40 0.37 0.43 1.01 -0.18 0.87 -0.41 0.14 0.23 
1986 2.32 0.67 1.32 -0.18 1.00 0.86 2.21 0.67 1.46 0.10 0.75 0.57 
1987 -2.21 -0.59 -2.17 -0.85 -0.03 0.26 -2.82 -1.12 -1.69 -0.17 -1.13 -0.95 
1988 0.38 -0.40 -0.41 -1.23 0.79 0.83 1.23 0.34 -0.24 -1.11 1.47 1.45 
1989 0.50 0.55 -0.78 -0.55 1.28 1.10 0.33 0.52 -0.94 -0.63 1.28 1.15 
1990 1.86 0.24 0.93 -0.39 0.93 0.63 1.66 0.22 0.59 -0.58 1.07 0.81 
1991 1.56 -0.09 1.20 -0.38 0.36 0.28 1.27 -0.31 1.50 -0.21 -0.22 -0.10 
1992 1.79 -0.35 1.82 -0.10 -0.03 -0.25 2.39 0.22 1.63 -0.32 0.76 0.54 
1993 0.59 -0.01 0.82 0.11 -0.23 -0.12 0.75 0.09 0.99 0.25 -0.24 -0.17 
1994 0.97 -0.42 0.71 -0.56 0.26 0.14 0.80 -0.54 0.46 -0.78 0.34 0.24 
1995 2.23 -0.30 2.18 -0.35 0.06 0.06 2.65 0.20 2.24 -0.19 0.41 0.40 
1996 2.58 -0.19 2.61 0.05 -0.03 -0.24 2.12 -0.55 2.47 0.05 -0.35 -0.60 
1997 3.06 0.18 2.81 0.05 0.25 0.13 2.82 0.01 2.66 -0.06 0.15 0.07 
1998 1.64 0.41 1.62 0.39 0.02 0.02 2.03 0.82 1.67 0.55 0.36 0.27 
1999 3.15 0.98 2.66 0.28 0.48 0.69 3.10 1.01 2.02 -0.38 1.07 1.39 
2000 -0.18 1.87 -2.02 0.76 1.84 1.11 -0.52 2.10 -2.52 -0.26 2.00 2.35 
2001 2.23 -0.64 2.82 -0.69 -0.58 0.05 2.79 -0.55 2.86 -0.54 -0.07 -0.01 
2002 0.41 -0.20 0.06 -0.56 0.34 0.36 -0.40 -0.73 0.28 -0.36 -0.67 -0.37 
2003 1.94 -0.08 2.69 0.61 -0.75 -0.69 2.08 0.22 2.81 0.88 -0.73 -0.66 
2004 0.39 0.16 1.09 0.77 -0.69 -0.61 0.63 0.39 1.20 0.89 -0.57 -0.49 
2005 1.71 -0.19 2.00 0.12 -0.29 -0.31 1.50 -0.37 1.92 0.14 -0.43 -0.52 
             
Avg 1.28 0.16 0.90 -0.19 0.38 0.34 1.25 0.21 0.78 -0.26 0.47 0.44 
[t] [4.0] [1.7] [2.7] [-1.9] [2.8] [2.6] [3.6] [1.6] [2.3] [-2.2] [3.3] [3.1] 
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TABLE 5 
Annualized announcement effects: Mutual fund trades and fund characteristics 
For each periodic mutual fund holdings report, we compute the average subsequent quarterly earnings 
announcement returns: raw and benchmark-adjusted; and equal-weighted across weight increases, weight decreases, 
long weight increases and short weight decreases, first buys, last sells, and long first buys and short last sells by 
fund. The benchmark return is the corresponding 5x5x5 size, book-to-market, and momentum average earnings 
announcement return in the matched quarter. We annualize these returns (multiplying by four) and average across all 
funds by past performance quintile (past returns), investment objective (style), total market value of reported 
holdings (fund size), turnover, incentive fee structure, and before and after Reg FD for each report date. For past 
returns, size, and turnover, quintiles go from lowest to highest. Past performance is defined based on the previous 
eight holdings reports for the corresponding definition of performance. T-statistics are in brackets. Returns are 






Decreases First Buys Last Sells 
First Buys-       
Last Sells 
 Ret BAR Ret BAR Ret BAR Ret BAR Ret BAR Ret BAR 
Quintile Panel A. Past Return 
1 1.17 0.00 0.82 -0.25 0.22 0.11 1.13 0.07 1.08 0.06 0.83 0.77 
2 1.25 0.01 1.17 -0.09 0.12 0.13 1.39 0.30 0.99 -0.19 0.24 0.43 
3 1.32 0.13 1.14 0.06 0.16 0.09 1.23 0.01 0.98 -0.24 0.34 0.07 
4 1.40 0.23 1.28 0.06 0.02 0.00 1.23 0.04 0.91 -0.16 -0.03 0.10 
5 1.39 0.24 1.29 0.16 0.28 0.32 1.27 0.19 0.70 -0.35 0.17 0.14 
5-1 [ 2.2] [ 2.3] [ 3.7] [ 3.8] [ 0.5] [ 1.6] [ 0.6] [ 0.5] [-1.6] [-1.9] [-1.9] [-1.8] 
Style Panel B. Style 
G 1.36 0.27 1.02 -0.06 0.35 0.33 1.30 0.25 0.86 -0.17 0.44 0.42 
G&I 1.25 0.05 1.06 -0.11 0.19 0.17 1.44 0.33 0.82 -0.32 0.62 0.65 
I 0.96 -0.29 0.83 -0.30 0.14 0.01 1.10 -0.13 0.91 -0.27 0.19 0.14 
G,<G&I,I> [ 1.8] [ 3.2] [ 0.4] [ 1.1] [ 1.7] [ 2.4] [ 0.1] [ 0.8] [-0.0] [ 0.6] [ 0.1] [ 0.1] 
G&I,<G,I> [ 1.0] [ 0.8] [ 1.6] [ 0.9] [-0.5] [-0.1] [ 1.2] [ 1.3] [-0.4] [-0.6] [ 1.1] [ 1.3] 
I,<G,G&I> [-2.3] [-3.3] [-1.3] [-1.5] [-0.8] [-1.5] [-0.9] [-1.4] [ 0.3] [-0.1] [-0.8] [-1.0] 
Quintile Panel C. Size 
1 1.17 0.02 0.87 -0.25 0.30 0.27 1.03 -0.07 0.77 -0.32 0.26 0.25 
2 1.28 0.15 0.89 -0.22 0.38 0.37 1.22 0.16 0.85 -0.25 0.37 0.41 
3 1.28 0.17 0.94 -0.16 0.34 0.33 1.39 0.33 0.96 -0.10 0.42 0.43 
4 1.31 0.19 1.00 -0.09 0.30 0.28 1.42 0.38 0.89 -0.21 0.53 0.59 
5 1.33 0.18 1.05 -0.06 0.28 0.25 1.35 0.22 0.79 -0.31 0.56 0.53 
5-1 [ 2.1] [ 2.2] [ 2.7] [ 2.7] [-0.2] [-0.3] [ 1.8] [ 1.7] [ 0.1] [ 0.0] [ 1.4] [ 1.3] 
Quintile Panel D. Turnover 
1 1.28 0.13 1.08 -0.07 0.20 0.21 1.28 0.21 1.02 -0.09 0.26 0.29 
2 1.25 0.14 0.98 -0.11 0.27 0.25 1.24 0.26 0.53 -0.48 0.70 0.74 
3 1.25 0.16 1.01 -0.08 0.24 0.24 1.16 0.14 1.04 -0.03 0.12 0.17 
4 1.34 0.23 0.90 -0.15 0.43 0.37 1.42 0.33 0.63 -0.39 0.79 0.72 
5 1.39 0.30 0.99 -0.07 0.40 0.37 1.41 0.32 0.86 -0.18 0.55 0.50 
5-1 [ 0.8] [ 1.2] [-0.6] [ 0.0] [ 1.9] [ 1.5] [ 0.5] [ 0.5] [-0.7] [-0.4] [ 0.9] [ 0.7] 
Fees Panel E. Incentive Fees 
Yes 1.38 0.32 0.89 -0.18 0.49 0.50 1.20 0.23 0.67 -0.39 0.53 0.62 
No 1.27 0.14 0.95 -0.16 0.32 0.30 1.28 0.20 0.86 -0.24 0.43 0.44 
Yes-No [0.8] [1.4] [-0.5] [-0.2] [0.9] [1.1] [-0.3] [0.1] [-0.7] [-0.5] [0.3] [0.5] 
RegFD Panel F. Regulation FD 
Pre 1.27 0.24 0.72 -0.24 0.55 0.49 1.24 0.31 0.55 -0.37 0.69 0.67 
Post 1.32 -0.19 1.72 0.05 -0.40 -0.24 1.31 -0.20 1.81 0.20 -0.50 -0.41 
Pre-Post [-0.1] [ 1.8] [-1.1] [-1.1] [ 2.8] [ 2.7] [-0.1] [ 1.4] [-1.4] [-1.9] [ 3.5] [ 3.2] 
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TABLE 6 
Earnings surprises (EPS) 
 For each periodic mutual fund holdings report, we compute the average subsequent earnings announcement surprise 
equal-weighted across weight increases, weight decreases, first buys, last sells, and the difference between weight 
increases and decreases and between first buys and last sells. We define the earnings announcement surprise as the 
difference of the actual and consensus earnings per share (EPS), scaled by the share price at the beginning of the 
forecast period. Consensus and actual EPS comes from the IBES summary file. We annualize these surprises 
(multiplying by four) and average across all funds within a year. T-statistics in brackets are based on quarterly 








Decreases First Buys Last Sells 
First Buys-
Last Sells 
1984 -0.35 -1.26 0.91 -1.28 -1.87 0.59 
1985 -1.19 -2.32 1.13 -1.24 -2.46 1.21 
1986 -1.19 -2.06 0.87 -1.14 -2.55 1.41 
1987 -0.66 -2.01 1.34 -0.74 -2.62 1.88 
1988 0.44 -0.44 0.88 0.06 -1.65 1.71 
1989 -0.09 -0.68 0.60 -0.04 -1.73 1.69 
1990 0.13 -1.39 1.52 -0.33 -2.49 2.16 
1991 -0.43 -1.22 0.79 -0.41 -1.80 1.40 
1992 -0.31 -0.68 0.37 -0.25 -1.02 0.77 
1993 -0.18 -0.61 0.43 -0.31 -1.23 0.92 
1994 -0.10 -0.40 0.30 -0.26 -0.61 0.35 
1995 -0.13 -0.44 0.31 -0.27 -0.77 0.49 
1996 -0.25 -0.43 0.18 -0.31 -0.72 0.42 
1997 -0.17 -0.51 0.33 -0.27 -0.60 0.33 
1998 -0.39 -0.77 0.38 -0.47 -1.00 0.53 
1999 -0.25 -0.80 0.55 -0.27 -1.09 0.82 
2000 -0.05 -0.60 0.55 -0.08 -1.32 1.23 
2001 -0.21 -1.00 0.79 -0.35 -1.50 1.16 
2002 0.08 -0.43 0.51 -0.01 -0.80 0.79 
2003 0.30 -0.03 0.34 0.27 -0.37 0.63 
2004 0.11 -0.03 0.13 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
2005 0.11 -0.01 0.12 0.08 -0.01 0.09 
       
Avg -0.22 -0.83 0.61 -0.35 -1.30 0.94 
SD 0.50 0.85 0.60 0.62 1.09 0.96 





For each periodic mutual fund holdings report, we compute the average total subsequent period return: raw and 
benchmark-adjusted; and equal-weighted across weight increases, weight decreases, long weight increases and short 
weight decreases, first buys, last sells, and long first buys and short last sells by fund. The characteristics benchmark 
return is the corresponding 5x5x5 size, book-to-market, and momentum return in the matched quarter. We annualize 
these returns (multiplying by four) and average across all funds within a year. Returns are Winsorized at the top and 
bottom one percent. T-statistics in brackets are based on quarterly means and standard deviations thereof, except for 
the last row, where the T-statistics test the hypothesis that the difference between the annual average earnings 
announcement returns and 0.05 times the annual average total returns is equal to zero. 
 
 Earnings Announcement Returns (Annualized) Total Returns (Annualized) 
 Increases-Decreases First Buys-Last Sells Increases-Decreases First Buys-Last Sells 
Year Return BAR Return BAR Return BAR Return BAR 
1980 1.76 1.67 1.44 1.31 -6.52 -6.19 6.62 6.26 
1981 0.50 0.82 0.71 0.92 4.99 3.57 5.86 5.65 
1982 1.54 1.28 2.60 2.39 11.04 9.40 13.83 12.55 
1983 0.36 0.38 1.10 1.23 0.78 -0.98 3.69 4.02 
1984 0.15 0.11 0.69 0.65 2.02 1.59 2.51 1.38 
1985 0.37 0.43 0.14 0.23 2.42 2.50 1.33 1.27 
1986 1.00 0.86 0.75 0.57 0.11 -0.19 -0.04 -0.79 
1987 -0.03 0.26 -1.13 -0.95 -1.78 -1.25 1.00 1.62 
1988 0.79 0.83 1.47 1.45 -1.05 -1.03 1.07 0.80 
1989 1.28 1.10 1.28 1.15 5.18 4.27 7.19 6.13 
1990 0.93 0.63 1.07 0.81 0.39 -0.90 1.59 0.09 
1991 0.36 0.28 -0.22 -0.10 2.12 1.17 5.20 3.54 
1992 -0.03 -0.25 0.76 0.54 -0.63 -1.34 3.55 3.46 
1993 -0.23 -0.12 -0.24 -0.17 1.06 -0.04 1.27 0.39 
1994 0.26 0.14 0.34 0.24 -0.51 -0.65 -0.46 -0.79 
1995 0.06 0.06 0.41 0.40 1.46 0.99 2.31 1.63 
1996 -0.03 -0.24 -0.35 -0.60 1.69 1.06 1.11 1.00 
1997 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.07 -0.17 -0.04 2.82 2.32 
1998 0.02 0.02 0.36 0.27 5.52 3.15 6.73 3.17 
1999 0.48 0.69 1.07 1.39 13.66 12.90 14.93 13.17 
2000 1.84 1.11 2.00 2.35 3.11 -0.61 -6.41 -1.29 
2001 -0.58 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -12.04 -9.75 -6.10 -6.91 
2002 0.34 0.36 -0.67 -0.37 2.34 0.73 -0.34 -0.57 
2003 -0.75 -0.69 -0.73 -0.66 -1.62 -2.41 -6.17 -4.76 
2004 -0.69 -0.61 -0.57 -0.49 -0.33 -0.33 -0.06 0.10 
2005 -0.29 -0.31 -0.43 -0.52 2.20 1.79 2.79 2.22 
         
Avg 0.38 0.34 0.47 0.44 1.35 0.66 2.53 2.14 
[t] [2.8] [2.6] [3.3] [3.1] [1.5] [0.9] [2.6] [2.7] 
         
Percent 
of Total 
Return 27.88 50.96 18.47 20.61     
[t] [2.3] [2.8] [2.1] [2.3]     
 
